A range of attacks on network components, such as algorithmic denial-of-service attacks and cryptanalysis via timing attacks, are enabled by data structures for which an adversary can predict the durations of operations that he will induce on the data structure. In this paper we introduce the problem of designing data structures that confound an adversary attempting to predict the timing of future operations he induces, even if he has adaptive and exclusive access to the data structure and the timings of past operations. We also design a data structure for implementing a set (supporting membership query, insertion, and deletion) that exhibits timing unpredictability and that retains its efficiency despite adversarial attacks. To demonstrate these advantages, we develop a framework by which an adversary tracks a probability distribution on the data structure's state based on the timings it emitted, and infers invocations to meet his attack goals.
Introduction
An adversary's ability to predict the timing characteristics of selected interactions with a networked component is instrumental in a wide range of potential attacks on that component or the network it defends. For example, algorithmic denial-of-service attacks depend on the adversary crafting requests that he can predict will be particularly costly for the component to process (e.g., [1, 2, 3] ). Other attacks can benefit from predictable timings, whether they be expensive or not. For example, remote timing attacks on components that use cryptographic keys (e.g., [4, 5] ) benefit if the adversary is able to predict the processing time other than that involving the cryptographic key being cryptanalyzed, so that this "noise" can be subtracted from the observed timings to obtain those timings related to the key itself.
In this paper we abstract from these scenarios the basic problem of developing data structures for which the timing of any particular operation is unpredictable. We consider an adversary who knows the implementation of the data structure, and who has adaptive and exclusive access to it: the adversary can invoke operations on the data structure and observe their timings (and responses) in order to discern the structure's underlying state, without interference from other queries potentially modifying that state. Despite this power, we require that the data structure resist the adversary's attempts to predict how long its future invocations will take to service. Moreover, so as to rule out implementations that obscure timings by making their operations vastly more expensive, we require that the performance of the operations be competitive with other, timing-predictable implementations of the same abstract data type, even against an adversary bent on decaying their efficiency.
As a first step in this direction, we propose an implementation of a set that supports insertions, deletions, and membership queries, and that meets the requirements outlined above. Our set implementation is derived from skip lists, a popular data structure for implementing sets, but exhibits timing unpredictability unlike regular skip lists (as we will demonstrate). In particular, our implementation introduces novel techniques for modifying skip lists during queries, so as to make them more timing-unpredictable with little additional overhead.
To quantify the timing unpredictability of our proposed set implementation, we develop a methodology by which an adversary, based on the timings he observed for his previous operation invocations, can track a probability distribution on the state of the data structure. We also show how the adversary can use this distribution to infer an invocation that will best refine his ability to predict timings of future invocations, or that will best manipulate the data structure so as to make it maximally inefficient. We have implemented this attack methodology in a tool to which we subject our proposed set implementation.
The results of our evaluation indicate that our proposed set implementation is substantially more timing-unpredictable than a regular skip list. Moreover, we show that our set implementation is efficient, in that it retains its good performance despite the contrary efforts of the adversary, while the adversary achieves considerable decay of a standard skip list's performance. These advantages derive from the adversary's uncertainty as to the shape of the data structure at any point in time, in contrast to a standard skip list, which the adversary can unambiguously reverse-engineer in little time.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows. We introduce the problem of achieving timing unpredictability in data structures. We propose a novel set implementation that improves timing unpredictability over that achieved by other set implementations at little additional cost. We demonstrate these advantages through a methodology by which an adversary determines requests to best refine his ability to predict timings of future operations or to decay the performance of those operations.
Related Work
In this paper we explore the construction of a data structure that alters its shape (and thus its timing characteristics) randomly, even as frequently as on a per-operation basis. This high-level idea is borrowed from approaches to render timing attacks against cryptographic implementations (e.g., [4, 5] ) more difficult, by randomizing the cryptographic secrets involved in the computation in each operation. A well-known example is "blinding" an RSA private key operation m d mod N by computing this as (mr e ) d r −1 mod N for a random r ∈ Z Algorithmic denial-of-service attacks, in which an adversary crafts invocations that he can predict will be costly to process, have led to proposals to use data structures less susceptible to such attacks (e.g., [2, 3] ). These data structures generally fall into two categories: those that bound worst-case performance and those that attempt to make worst-case inputs unpredictable. The first category consists mainly of self-balancing data structures (e.g., splay trees [6] , AVL trees [7] ), which make no attempt to limit an adversary's ability to predict operation costs. Thus, while these data structures keep access costs consistently below some desirable asymptotic threshold, the costs are typically easy to predict, allowing these structures to be exploited in other forms of timing attacks. The second category consists of data structures that mitigate algorithmic denial-of-service attacks by limiting an adversary's ability to induce worst-case performance reliably. Typically, this limiting is accomplished using either a randomized insertion algorithm (e.g., randomized binary search trees [8] ) or a secret unknown to the adversary (e.g., keyed hash tables [9] ). We show in Section 4 that randomized insertion is not sufficient to achieve unpredictability versus an adaptive adversary. A deterministic algorithm based on a fixed secret faces the same difficulty: the adaptive adversary's ability to probe the data structure allows him to uncover its shape and thus its timings, even without knowing the secret.
Skip lists, from which our proposed set implementation is built, have been widely studied, and many variants have been proposed. Most are motivated by performance, to improve access time for certain input sequences or in certain applications (e.g., [10, 11, 12, 13] ). Others are skip-list variants that can safely be used by concurrent processes or in distributed environments (e.g., [14, 15, 16] ). Aspects of some of these variants bear similarities to elements of our proposal, but none of them addresses timing predictability or performance under adversarial access.
Also related to our work is online algorithm analysis (e.g., [17] ), which deals with algorithms that process requests as they arrive ("online" algorithms) and how they perform compared to optimal algorithms that process the same requests all at once ("offline" algorithms). Of particular interest here is the field's analysis of adaptive adversaries that select each request with knowledge of the random choices made by the online algorithm so far. Our adversary is weaker, selecting new requests knowing only the duration of each previous request. Durations leak information about the algorithm's random choices but may not reveal those choices unambiguously. Our weaker adversary is motivated both by a practical perspective -an adversary can easily measure durations but would rarely be given all random choices made by the algorithm -and also by our hope to explore the extent to which randomization can limit the adversary's knowledge of the data structure's future timing behavior. Assuming the adversary knows all prior random choices would preclude this exploration.
Goals
As discussed in Section 1, a common thread in many attacks is the adversary's ability to predict the timing of operations that will result from his activity (and correspondingly to manipulate the data structure to produce desirable timings). These timings can be particularly large, as in an algorithmic denial-of-service attack. Or, it may simply suffice that the timings can be predicted accurately, whether they be large or not, e.g., to minimize the "noise" associated with other activities when cryptanalyzing keys via timing attacks.
As an illustrative example, consider that a server using OpenSSL does approximately ten set lookups (implemented using hash tables) between receiving a ClientHello message and sending its ServerKeyExchange response. Because the ServerKeyExchange message often involves a private key operation -signing the parameters for Diffie-Hellman key exchange -the timing the client observes between messages involves both set lookup operations and the private key operation. As such, having an understanding of the timing of the set lookup operations can enable an adversary to obtain a more fine-grained measurement of the private key operation. As another example, popular interpreted languages such as Perl and Python incorporate associative arrays implemented as sets (specifically using hash tables) as a primary built-in data type, providing an avenue for exploiting timing in a range of applications written in those languages. Perl's hash function has already been shown to be vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks [3] , and Python's hash function is intentionally trivial -integers, for example, hash to their lower-order bits.
The goal of our designs in this paper will be to limit an adversary's ability to predict and manipulate the timing of his future operations on a data structure. More precisely, we consider an abstract data type with predefined operations, each of which accepts some number of arguments of known types. Motivated by the examples above, and to make our discussion more concrete, we will use a set data type (Set) as a running example throughout this paper. A data structure S of type Set would typically support the following operations:
Invocation Return value Duration 1. S.insert (7) "ok" 4 2. S.insert (12) "ok" 6 3. S.lookup(7) 7 3 . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 1. Example execution
We give an adversary adaptive access to S; i.e., the adversary can perform any invocation of his choice, and receives the response to this invocation before choosing his next. Since the adversary can time the duration until receiving the response, we model this by returning not only the return value from the invocation, but also the duration of the invocation (in some appropriate unit of time that we will leave unspecified for now). For example, an adversary's interaction with the set S might look like Figure 1 . The notion of timing-unpredictability that we study in this paper comprises two types of requirements, which we describe below.
Invocations must be efficient: Efficient operation is not a requirement unique to timing-unpredictability, obviously, as it has been a primary goal of algorithm design since its inception. We explicitly include it here, however, to emphasize that we cannot sacrifice (too much) efficiency in order to gain unpredictability. Here we measure efficiency in terms of the extent to which the above adaptive adversary can manipulate the data structure to render invocations of his choice as expensive as possible. Timing of invocations must otherwise be "unpredictable": Intuitively, to be timing-unpredictable, we require that the adversary be unable to predict the time that invocations will take. More specifically, after observing the timings associated with operations of his choice, the adversary can generate the probability distribution of possible timings that each next possible invocation could produce. We measure unpredictability by the minimum of the entropies of the timing distributions for all next possible invocations, i.e., min inv H(dur(inv)) where dur(inv) is a random variable representing the timing of invocation inv, conditioned on the invocations and their timings that the adversary has observed so far, and H() denotes entropy. Intuitively, the entropy gives a measure of how uncertain the adversary is of the resulting timing. There are natural extensions of this property, e.g., using the average entropy over all invocations, i.e., avg inv H(dur(inv)). However, because the minimum entropy will always be at most the average entropy, we consider only the former here.
Two observations about the above goals are in order. First, there is a tension between performance and unpredictability, in that the efficiency requirement limits the degree of unpredictability for which we can hope. Notably, a data structure of size n that implements invocations in O(f (n)) time for nondecreasing f permits unpredictability (as defined above) of at most log 2 O(f (n)) = O(log 2 f (n)). One way to balance these two might leave the timing distribution across invocations on the data structure unchanged from that of a timing-predictable structure (to retain efficiency) but make it impossible to predict which invocations would produce which timings (so that timings are unpredictable).
Second, though neither of the above goals explicitly includes hiding the data structure state from the adversary, doing so can be helpful to our goals, and some of our analysis will measure what the adversary can know about that state. One approach to hide this from the adversary would be to insert a random delay prior to each invocation response. However, just as such random delays do not thwart cryptographic timing attacks (these delays can be filtered out statistically and the keys still recovered), they will only delay an adversary from recovering the data structure state. An alternative might be to slow all operations to take the same time, presumably calculated as a function of n. However, this benefits neither efficiency nor timing unpredictability, our primary goals here.
Skip Lists
One goal of this paper is to develop a Set implementation that meets the requirements of Section 3. We do so by building from skip lists, a well-known implementation of a Set. We first describe the skip-list structure, and then we discuss its vulnerabilities to timing attacks. Data structure and algorithm: A skip list is a data structure that can be used to implement the Set abstract data type [18] . A skip list comprises multiple non-empty linked lists, denoted list 1 , . . . , list m , where m ≥ 1 can vary over the life of the skip list. Each linked list consists of nodes, each with a pointer to its successor in the list; the successor of node nd is denoted nd.nxt. List list begins with a head node, denoted head[ ]. Each other node in list represents a value that was inserted into the set; the value of each such node nd is nd.val. The nodes in each linked list are sorted in increasing order of their values. The first linked list, list 1 , includes (a node for) each value inserted into the set. Each list for 1 < ≤ m contains a subset of the inserted values, and satisfies the following property: if a value is in list , then it is also a member of list −1 , and the node nd representing v in list contains a pointer nd.down to the node representing
To lookup v in a skip list, the search begins at the head of the m-th linked list. It traverses that linked list, returning if it finds v or stopping when it reaches the last node in the list whose value is strictly less than v. In the latter case, if the current list is also list 1 , then it returns ⊥. Otherwise, the search drops to the next lower linked list and continues as before. An example of a lookup in a standard skip list is shown in Figure 2 .
To remove a value v from a skip list, we navigate to v by the same method. Once located, we simply remove the nodes representing v from the linked lists. Any empty linked lists are deleted, and m is adjusted accordingly. When inserting a value into the skip list, we first probabilistically determine its "height" in the skip list, i.e., the largest value h ≥ 1 such that list h will contain the new value. We sample the new height from a distribution that yields any h with probability 2 −h . Once the height of the new value is so determined, we find the position of the new value in list h using the same search method as in the lookup and remove operations. Then we simply add the new value to the proper locations in lists list h , . . ., list 1 , creating new lists (if h > m) and adjusting m as necessary. As such, in expectation only 1/2 of the values are represented in list 2 , only 1/4 are represented in list 3 , and so on. For this reason, a skip list of n values supports lookup, insert and remove operations in O(log 2 n) time with high probability.
Weaknesses: Despite their randomized nature, skip lists are vulnerable to attacks on both predictability and efficiency. Section 6 details how an adversary can track the distribution of possible skip lists (that is, the distribution of different skip-list configurations that represent the same Set) given access to a skip list only via invocations and their observed durations. Using this technique, even an adversary passively observing random lookup invocations can quickly determine the internal configuration of the skip list. For example, Figure 3 shows the graph of the average entropy in bits (over 100 runs) of the skip-list distribution for such an adversary over the course of 25 observed lookup invocations and their durations on a skip list of size 5. This result illustrates that the randomization that takes place during an insert operation is not enough to hide the internal configuration of the skip list from an adversary. Proposals exist for occasionally rearranging the entire internal configuration of a skip list, 1 but as these methods must operate on each value in the skip list, they are generally performed only when there is some other reason for an O(n) operation (e.g., enumerating the entire contents of the skip list). We argue that these methods are insufficient to protect a skip list for two reasons. First, they are designed to repair inefficiently balanced skip lists, doing little to hinder predictability attacks unless they occur very frequently. Second, an adversary can simply choose not to invoke any operations that would result in reconfiguration, and reconfiguration is too expensive to invoke frequently in a proactive manner.
Having sufficiently reduced the entropy of the skip-list distribution, the adversary can trivially predict the timing of future invocations. Moreover, the adversary can bias the skip-list distribution toward inefficient configurations by adaptively crafting invocations using observed duration information. Specifically, an adversary might target values with heights h > 1, removing and re-adding them until they are inserted at height h = 1. Once the adversary has adjusted all values with height h > 1 in this way, the skip list will have been reduced to a linked list with Ω(n) performance.
A Timing-Unpredictable Set
In this section we describe ways to counter the weaknesses identified in Section 4, and then use these to construct a proposed timing-unpredictable Set. Manipulating the origin:In a standard skip list, every operation begins from head[m]. We propose in this section to reduce the ability of the adversary to predict the timing characteristics of future operations by modifying, on a per operation basis, the starting point of a lookup, insert, or remove. To do so, we introduce a search origin into the skip list, and this origin will change on a per operation basis.
Intuitively, the search origin can be thought of as a new value that is inserted using an operation similar to insert, except that the height h chosen for it is h = m. Then, rather than starting a search for a value (or location to insert a new value) from head[m], the search is begun from this origin value's node in list m ; otherwise the search behaves as normal. In order to enable values smaller than the origin value to be located, however, we make each linked list circular (as shown in Figure 4 .) In practice, it is unnecessary for the origin to be represented using its own nodes, and doing so would incur heavier operation costs than are necessary. Instead, we define the origin to be a sequence ond [ Figure 5 gives some examples of search paths. The search path for lookup (6) . The search wraps from high-valued nodes to low-value nodes.
The search path for lookup(28). The search travels down by origin nodes until a move right has been made. In order to maximize the adversary's uncertainty as to the state of the skip list, and hence to maximize his uncertainty as to the timing it will exhibit, we choose a value v uniformly at random from the values in the skip list when establishing a new origin (relative to v). In order to select a value uniformly at random, we add to each node nd two additional fields. The first is nd.skip, which records the number of values in the skip list that are "skipped" between nd and nd.nxt. More precisely, if nd is in list 1 , then nd.skip = 1, and otherwise nd.skip = c−1 i=0 nd.down (.nxt) i .skip where (.nxt) i denotes i copies of ".nxt" and c > 0 is the smallest value satisfying nd.nxt.down = nd.down(.nxt) c . The second field is nd.idx, which is used only when nd is a part of the origin. It records the absolute index of nd in the skip list. These fields can be maintained in the skip list across insert and remove operations (and origin changes) with no change in the asymptotic cost of these operations.
Given these extra fields, establishing an origin relative to a value otgt selected uniformly at random in a skip list with n values is achieved as follows: choose a j ∈ [1, n] at random, and then use the nd.skip and nd.idx values to navigate to the j-th value in the list (to which otgt will be set) and assemble the new origin relative to that value. Again, this can be performed with only an additive cost to the skip-list operation that does not change its asymptotic complexity. Height adjustment: The second countermeasure to timing predictability that we employ is to "height adjust" a value in the skip list. Recall that when a value is inserted into a standard skip list, we probabilistically determine its "height" in the skip list, i.e., the largest value h ≥ 1 such that list h will contain the new value, by sampling from a distribution that yields any h with probability 2 −h . When height adjusting a value we simply re-sample from this distribution to obtain a new height for the value, and then modify linked lists to reflect this value's newly chosen height. The effect is equivalent to having removed and then re-inserted the value. However, since this is accomplished with searching to the value only once, and without removing nodes that would be re-inserted, it is far less costly than actually removing and re-inserting the value. The TUSL skip list: There are many potential ways to combine origin movement and height adjustment to implement skip-list variants that should better resist an adversary divining and manipulating its structure. For our study in Sections 6 and 7, we consider the following variant, to which we refer as TUSL (for "Timing-Unpredictable Skip List"). We designed the TUSL such that its variations from standard skip lists would introduce only small additional costs and also not change the asymptotic complexity of the Set operations. insert To perform an insert(v), first select the height h for the new value. Next, search for the location of v starting from the origin. If v is not already in the skip list, insert nodes for v into list 1 , . . . , list h . Regardless of whether v was already in the skip list, select a new otgt at random, and move the origin to be relative to it. If v was already in the skip list, adjust otgt to height h. remove To perform a remove(v), search for v starting from the origin. If v is found, remove its nodes from the linked lists. Whether or not v was found, select a new otgt at random, and move the origin to be relative to it. Finally, height adjust otgt. lookup To perform a lookup(v), search for v starting from the origin. After the return value is determined (v or ⊥), select a new otgt at random, and move the origin to be relative to it. Finally, height adjust otgt.
Note that each operation selects a height for one value, namely the new otgt or a newly inserted value. These operations are a small constant factor more expensive than those of a standard skip list, but we will show in Section 7 that a TUSL can outperform a standard skip list against an adversary intent on decaying its performance, even when skip lists are small.
Predictability Evaluation
In this section we perform an adversarial evaluation of the extent to which our TUSL design in Section 5 achieves unpredictability. We begin by presenting how the adversary can track the distribution on skip lists based on the timing he observes for each of his invocations. We then present results about the entropy of this distribution, and then we build on these results to demonstrate the timing unpredictability of our TUSL construction. Tracking the skip-list distribution: The timings observed by the adversary and the skip-list algorithm itself (which he knows), induce a probability distribution on the space of skip lists from his perspective. Let I i = (inv 1 , dur(inv 1 )), . . ., (inv i , dur(inv i )) denote a sequence of invocations and their durations. Each inv i is applied to the skip list S i −1 (i.e., the skip list resulting from invocations inv 1 . . . inv i −1 ) in sequence, taking time dur(inv i ) (a random variable) and yielding S i (also a random variable). When we use I i = (inv 1 , d 1 ) 
(1) We derived this equation as an application of Bayes' theorem, but we omit its lengthy derivation here due to space limitations. Note that
in the denominator are either identically 0 or identically 1, in that the conditions and the invocation unambiguously specify whether S i+1 = s and dur(inv i+1 ) = d i+1 .
In addition to computing a distribution on skip lists on the basis of timings actually observed from invocations on S, the adversary can also compute posterior distributions conditioned on a hypothetical invocation and the distribution of timings for that invocation that the prior distribution on skip lists dictates. In this way, the adversary can compute not only a distribution on the current state of the skip list, but also can compute the probability that a particular invocation will yield a particular timing and, thus, the posterior distribution on the skip list that would result. Entropy of the skip-list distribution: To provide insight into the results we report below, we first present tests in which the adversary, when selecting inv i+1 , chooses the invocation that minimizes H(S i+1 | I i ), i.e., that minimizes the entropy of the skip-list distribution that results from the chosen invocation. We measure H(S i+1 | I i+1 ), i.e., the extent to which the adversary succeeds in minimizing that entropy. Although minimizing the entropy of the skip-list distribution is not a stated goal in Section 3, this measure provides insight into the uncertainty that the adversary faces in trying to predict timings for future invocations or to manipulate the skip list to slow its performance.
In each test, the adversary is launched with an empty skip list and a target size N . Each run begins by the adversary performing N random insert invocations, to bring the skip list to its initial size. The adversary monitors the time that each of these invocations takes, as well as all subsequent invocations. Once the skip list contains N values, the adversary performs lookup invocations only, chosen to minimize H(S i+1 | I i ) in each step i + 1. We disallow remove invocations in these tests, in particular, so that the adversary cannot decrease H(S i | I i ) simply by removing elements. After performing the lookup invocation and measuring its duration, the adversary updates his skip-list distribution using (1), and continues with searching for his next invocation, etc. To limit the number of possible skip lists in our tests, we remove at each step (after the initial N insert invocations) skip lists with probability less than = 4
−n , where n is the current skip-list size. (n = N always in the tests of this section.)
In our analysis, the "time" that the adversary measures for an invocation is a count of skip-list node visits plus, in the case of an insert operation (or a remove, though again, none of these were performed in the tests in this section), the changes to linked lists in the skip list. This information is not clouded by other factors that could influence time measurements and so discloses more precise information than the adversary might expect in practice. The results of our tests are shown in Figure 6 for N ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}. As these figures show, the average entropy of a TUSL grows linearly in N for these values, even when the adversary chooses the best next invocation to minimize that entropy. This observation provides insight into the results that will follow.
We were unable to extend past N = 7 in our tests due to the computational difficulty of doing so. To get a sense of the immensity of these tests -and the task the adversary faces, as well -consider the following rough calculation for a distribution on skip lists of size N = 6: The adversary uses (1) to update the skiplist distribution (from S i to S i+1 ) to account for a single observed duration. The summations in the equation occur over each possible TUSL s (typically about 160), all sufficiently plausible heights (we consider only 7 for this example), and all possible positions for a new otgt (there are N of these). Thus, the inner term of each summation must be evaluated approximately 160 * 7 * 6 = 6, 720 times. Also, this calculation must be done once for each s , meaning that to transform a distribution for S i into one for S i+1 for a single invocation/duration pair, the adversary must do 160 * 6, 720 ≈ 1 million calculations. Now consider that the adversary's search of next invocations includes N possible lookup invocations, each with about 30 possible durations. So, even choosing the next invocation to perform requires examining 6 * 30 = 180 possible distributions, and the adversary must do 180 * 1, 075, 200 ≈ 200 million evaluations of the inner term of (1) to generate a single sample for the distribution for N = 6 in Figure 6 . For the N = 7 plot, the cost jumps to ≈ 750 million evaluations per sample. This computational cost has limited our ability to scale our tests beyond N = 7 at present. 
Timing unpredictability:
We now move on to tests in which the adversary attacks timing unpredictability. These tests were performed with the same methodology as those above, except that the adversary chooses as his next invocation arg min inv i+1 H(dur(inv i+1 ) | I i ). We record H(dur(inv i+1 ) | I i ) for that invocation inv i+1 at each step, as evidence of the extent to which an adversary can minimize the timing predictability of the data structure. Figure 7 shows the results of these tests. The plots show that the timing entropy is less than the entropy of the skip-list distribution, as can be seen by comparing Figures 6 and 7 . This occurs because many different skip-list configurations can give rise to the same timing for certain invocations, and so not all of the uncertainty of the skip-list configuration carries over to uncertainty for timing behavior. Figure 7 suggests that the timing entropy grows roughly linearly for the range of N that we have been able to explore. (These tests are limited by the same computational challenges described earlier.) However, because for an adversary who does not try to slow the skip-list invocations (or is unable to do so, see Section 7), the skip-list implements lookup invocations in O(log 2 N ) time with high probability, the timing entropy is limited to O(log 2 log 2 N ) as N grows, as discussed in Section 3.
While min inv i+1 H(dur(inv i+1 ) | I i ) indicates the timing unpredictability of the data structure, it nevertheless provides little insight into how erroneous the adversary's view of the timing might be. For example, if the adversary assigns equal likelihood to two timings for inv i+1 , we might consider him to be better off if these timings are both close to the correct answer than if one is wildly incorrect; H(dur(inv i+1 ) | I i ) does not distinguish between these cases. To further clarify, in Figure 8 we plot the CDF of the earth mover's distance (EMD) [19, 20] between (i) the adversary's distribution for dur(inv i+1 ) conditioned on I i and (ii) the distribution dur(inv i+1 ) for that invocation on the actual skip list that the adversary is attacking. Intuitively, if each distribution is a way of piling one unit of dirt, EMD measures the cost (the amount of dirt moved times the distance it is moved) of turning one distribution into the other. This plot shows that the uncertainty the adversary faces is not solely due to the randomized implementation of inv i+1 but rather is compounded by the entropy of the skip-list distribution shown in Figure 6 . That is, if the adversary's skip-list distribution had no entropy (i.e., if the adversary knew exactly the configuration of the skip list), his distribution would match the real distribution, and the EMD would be zero. As can be seen in Figure 8 , this is very nearly the case for normal skip lists.
Efficiency Evaluation
We now evaluate how TUSLs fare in terms of performance against the adaptive adversary of Section 3. Our evaluation is like that of Section 6, with a few important differences. First, to maximize the invocation times (versus simply reducing entropy for skip lists of a fixed size or their timing behaviors), the adversary must be allowed to remove and insert elements. For example, an adversary might prefer to remove an element that he discerns to have a large height in the skip list, in an effort to make all elements have the same height (which yields worst-case performance for the skip list). For this reason, in these tests the adversary also examines remove and insert operations at each step, though we restrict the adversary to maintaining the size of the skip list in the range N ± 2. This restriction prevents the adversary from "attacking" efficiency, for example, by simply always inserting more values. Second, to discern that a remove-insert pair, for example, might decay the performance of the skip list, it is necessary to permit the adversary to look ahead multiple moves to find a sequence that best accomplishes his goals. So, to enable these tests we implement a search for sequences of invocations that yield a heuristically optimal attack for the adversary (albeit while further compounding the cost of computing the attack). Searching for a nearly optimal attack: Suppose that I i = (inv 1 , d 1 ) , . . ., (inv i , d i ) is the sequence of invocations that the adversary performed and the durations that resulted from them. As shown in (1), the adversary can thus compute Pr [S i = s | I i ]. The adversary now wishes to predict the next invocation inv i+1 that will lead toward a skip-list configuration in which some operations are very expensive, thus violating our efficiency goals. To do so, he employs a function score that, when applied to a sequence I i+k that extends I i , produces a value that indicates the benefit or detriment to the adversary's goal of reducing performance. We will describe such a score function below.
The primary component of the adversary's attack is calculating, for a fixed sequence of invocations inv i+1 , . . . , inv i+k , the expected outcome:
In (2), it is understood that I i+k extends I i with invocations inv i+1 , . . . , inv i+k . It is, however, treated as a random variable here, taking on durations for the invocations inv i+1 , . . . , inv i+k .
When choosing inv i+1 , . . ., inv i+k to compute (2), the adversary faces an apparently difficult problem in that there are infinitely many invocations that are possible for each inv i+k . Notably, the adversary can insert any value into the skip list. However, the adversary need only consider inserting a value after each value already in the skip list -all insertions between the same two existing values are equivalent from a timing point of view -yielding n i+k −1 possible insert operations for a skip list already containing n i+k −1 values (i.e., where n i+k −1 is the size of S i+k −1 ). That is, for each inv i+k , 1 ≤ k ≤ k, the adversary need only consider n i+k −1 remove invocations, n i+k −1 insert invocations, and n i+k −1 lookup invocations, i.e., 3n i+k −1 in total.
Heuristics: There are two remaining choices that an adversary must make to search for his next invocation to perform: (i) He must decide for which invocation sequences inv i+1 , . . ., inv i+k to compute Equation (2) , and in particular how many such invocations to consider. (ii) He must choose a score function to guide his search. We adopt heuristic solutions (described below) to (i) and (ii), and as such, our search yields only a heuristically optimal choice.
To address (i), we define a function β :
then this probability is rounded down to zero. Then, only invocation sequences inv i+1 , . . ., inv i+k for which (2) is nonzero (per this coarsening) need be considered. In particular, k is not the same across sequences, but rather can be different per sequence. The intuitive justification for such a use of β is that durations for invocation sequences inv i+1 , . . ., inv i+k that are so improbable are not interesting to the adversary. In our tests below, β is determined empirically to strike a balance between exploring as many invocation sequences inv i+1 , . . ., inv i+k as possible and limiting search time. Moreover, β was set differently for TUSL adversaries and adversaries attacking a standard skip list to allow a TUSL adversary substantially more time to search for an effective next invocation. In fact, the average time allotted to the adversary to search for his next invocation was more than three orders of magnitude larger for the TUSL adversary, per value of N . As such, the results reported below that demonstrate advantages over basic skip lists are very conservative in this regard.
To address (ii), the adversary scores I i+k on the basis of the expected duration it induces for the most expensive subsequent invocation, i.e., score(I i+k ) = max inv i+k+1 E [dur(inv i+k+1 ) | I i+k ]. When his search concludes, he chooses the next invocation inv i+1 to actually perform to be the most promising next invocation, specifically arg max inv i+1 invi+2,...,inv i+k E inv i+1 ,...,inv i+k [score(I i+k ) | I i ], where the sum is taken over maximal sequences for which (2) was computed. Results: After observing the i-th invocation duration, suppose the adversary outputs arg max inv i+1 E [dur(inv i+1 ) | I i ], i.e., the invocation the adversary believes to be the most expensive. Figure 9 plots E [dur(inv)] for this invocation inv, for the current state of the actual skip list he is attacking, averaged over all runs, as a measure of performance. (• denotes a standard skip list, and + denotes a TUSL.) Figure 9 also shows the average performance of randomly selected invocations (where × and denote standard skip lists and TUSLs, respectively). Together these curves show that the adversary can cause his chosen invocations for a standard skip list to diverge in cost from random invocations. In contrast, the adversary is unsuccessful in causing this divergence with TUSLs, despite expending three orders of magnitude more effort. A consequence is that the adversary can quickly decay a standard skip list, even of size as small as 7 ± 2, to performance that is comparable to or worse than that to which the adversary can decay a TUSL, which appears to be little to none. As N grows, we expect these trends to continue, with the adversary maintaining average-case (O(log 2 N )) performance against TUSLs and worst-case performance (O(N )) against standard skip lists, such that the TUSL should soon easily outperform a standard skip list during an attack.
Conclusion
This paper is, to our knowledge, the first exploration of constructing data structures that will make it difficult for an adversary with adaptive access to the structure to predict the duration of future invocations or to manipulate the data structure to decay its efficiency. We presented a design for a Set abstract data type based on skip lists but enhanced to permit both searching for a value from a random origin and adjusting the height of a value's nodes per operation. We presented an instance of this design, called TUSL, which we showed offers benefits to both timing-unpredictability and efficiency against adaptive adversaries. To do so, we developed a framework that permits an adversary to track a distribution on skip lists implied by the invocation durations he has observed so far and to search for invocations that heuristically maximize his effectiveness in attacking efficiency or unpredictability.
As far as we are aware, this paper opens up a new research direction that could help to counteract a range of timing-related attacks, both known (e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] ) and as-yet-unknown. Numerous areas remain unexplored, such as more formal foundations for the goal of timing unpredictability, and other designs for timingunpredictable data structures.
